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Abstract
If I understand the architecture of Professor Miller’s argument
correctly, his lofty conclusion rests on two pillars, either of which he
regards as adequate to support it; these pillars in turn arise from a
single foundational premise.
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If I understand the architecture of Professor Miller's argument
correctly, his lofty conclusion rests on two pillars, either of which he
regards as adequate to support it; these pillars in turn arise from a
single foundational premise. The conclusion, of course, is that the man-
ufacture, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons is unconstitutional.
The premise is that nuclear war is "[b]y definition" unlimited.1 The
first pillar is constructed from clauses of the Constitution reinforced
with good intentions. The second is of similar construction, but is also
girded by a novel interpretation of international law.
His essay is admittedly only a "preliminary inquiry" 2 into the con-
stitutionality of nuclear weapons, but the architectural design must be
examined to see if it affords any reasonable hope of supporting his
conclusion.
Pillar I: The Well Intended Constitution
It is the leitmotif of Professor Miller's argument that the Constitu-
tion is not to be interpreted simply according to the terms of its text,
but informed by the Constitution's intentions.3 These intentions, we
learn, are not simply those of the people who wrote the text, but also,
and primarily, those present and future generations who live under its
authority.4 The ultimate end-stated vaguely enough to spark little op-
position--emerges as "human survival under conditions that allow
human dignity to be maximized."5 But the proper and good intention
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University.
1. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NovA L.J. 21, 30
(1982).
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. at 27.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 26.
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accompanying this end is to be found among the "clergy, physicians,
scientists, and businessmen [who] have grasped and [seek] to show
others the meaning of nuclear war."6 Lawyers are thus invited to share
their intentions and, so inspired, to read the text of the Constitution.
Three aspects of the Constitution contribute to the first pillar of
support-the Preamble, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Due Pro-
cess clause. Apparently Professor Miller believes each is independently
capable of supporting his conclusion, for he does not indicate how they
fit together except that they are each to be read with the Constitution's
"intention" in mind.
The most curious of these is the nondelegation doctrine. Professor
Miller suggests that it is unconstitutional for Congress "tacitly or ex-
pressly" to delegate the authority to the President to declare nuclear
war. One must wonder from what use of the nondelegation doctrine
Professor Miller expects to draw support. The oldest and most straight-
forward use of the nondelegation doctrine is, as the term implies, to
require that certain decisions can be made by Congress alone, that it
cannot delegate these to any other body." But this argument can pro-
vide no support for Professor Miller's conclusion that nuclear weapons
are unconstitutional because it implies that Congress does have the
constitutional authority to manufacture, deploy, and use nuclear
weapons.
Perhaps Professor Miller has in mind a more recent use of the
nondelegation doctrine, one which hinges on individual rights rather
than congressional duty." It implies that an individual has a right to the
careful reflection of Congress before his or her liberty is abridged. Con-
ceivably that liberty could be expanded to the liberty to be free from
nuclear threat. This use of the nondelegation doctrine could, like the
first use, imply that Congress does have the authority to wage nuclear
war. But the doctrine so used, unlike the first use, usually harbors a
serious reservation about the power that Congress has exercised. While
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 29.
8. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) and The Brig Aurora v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 383 (1813). On the nondelegation doctrine generally, see S.
BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
(1975).
9. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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an actual constitutional limit to that power must be established inde-
pendently of the nondelegation doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine is
at least supposed to elevate the sensitivity, or "raise the consciousness,"
of Congress to constitutional limitations.10 Again, however, the
nondelegation doctrine offers no support, in itself, for Professor Miller's
conclusion.
And one must further wonder how this use of the nondelegation
doctrine could function towards "consciousness raising." Following a
nuclear exchange should the Supreme Court declare the war to have
been unconstitutional? If Professor Miller is serious about his funda-
mental premise that nuclear war is by definition unlimited, then there
would be no Congress left to have its consciousness raised. But perhaps
the remedy lies in equity rather than in law. Should an injunction be
issued to halt the President from contemplating a nuclear exchange un-
til Congress explicitly assumes its constitutional obligation to set forth
the conditions, if any, in which it thinks nuclear war proper? Until
Congress makes up its mind, nuclear war would be limited, assuming
improbably that the President heeds the injunction, but hardly in a way
that Professor Miller or most any United States citizen can think
desirable."1
There is a third use of the nondelegation doctrine that might be
thought to question the constitutionality of nuclear weapons, which
would run as follows: only the President can act quickly enough to use
nuclear weapons; only Congress can decide in each instance whether
that use is justified. Aside from its wholly disingenuous use of the
nondelegation doctrine, this argument requires propositions of fact and
value that Professor Miller does not even assert, much less establish.
Thus, under any of the three possible uses of the nondelegation doc-
trine, it lends no support to his conclusion and must be regarded as
mere facade.
Infused with good intentions, the Preamble and the Due Process
clause are also pressed into impossible duties. "Nuclear weapons and
the delicate balance of terror jeopardize,"1 2 he tells us, each of the
10. It is used, as Professor Alexander Bickel has noted, "in the candid service of
avoiding a serious constitutional doubt." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
165 (1962) (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953)).
11. Miller, supra note 1.
12. Id. at 27.
67 1
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goals of the Preamble, especially in the sense that there might be no
"posterity" remaining to enjoy them. Similarly, "[n]uclear weapons so
endanger the lives, liberties, and properties of all Americans that they
should be considered to be a deprivation contrary to Due Process." 18
No doubt nuclear weapons do in some way jeopardize our goals and do
endanger our lives, liberties, and properties. But we have to ask, com-
pared to what?
Compared to a world in which there are only conventional weap-
ons? Clearly this is what Professor Miller hopes for, but our posterity
and our lives, liberties, and properties would not necessarily be ren-
dered more secure. One must discount the gravity of nuclear war by its
improbability,1 4 and one must remember that it was with conventional
weapons that Rome lowered Carthage to dust.
But let's grant the preferability of a world without nuclear weap-
ons. Can one discover a course of constitutionally mandated action?
Professor Miller declares that guiding the course is a "duty to take
action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world." '15 One might wonder how Professor Miller can leap from the
Constitution's rights and goals to world duties, but if the United States
had sovereignty commensurate with that duty throughout the world,
the duty would not be difficult to follow. The problem, of course, is that
such authority is lacking. What then can the United States do? We can
unilaterally disarm and achieve peace through submission. But Profes-
sor Miller implicitly agrees that while this might eliminate the nuclear
threat, it would sacrifice the nation's goals. We could take the initiative
in reducing our forces, but there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union
would follow suit and thus the delicate balance of terror could be ren-
dered an indelicate imbalance. We could negotiate in good faith, but
again there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union would do likewise.
Finally the United States could attempt to achieve nuclear superiority
and either negotiate from strength or, with a clear superiority, force the
Soviet Union into submission. Professor Miller might wish the courts to
appoint a special master to oversee the SALT negotiations, but what
13. Id. at 36.
14. Apologies to then Chief Judge Learned Hand, United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
15. Miller, supra note 1, at 24.
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course of action that court appointee would mandate is far from clear.
In short, all that this pillar can support is a requirement to make a
good faith effort to reduce the risk of nuclear war while not jeopardiz-
ing the nation's way of life. By no means is this a trivial obligation. But
first, it does not differ in kind from the sort of duty we have assumed
the Constitution to place on our public officials concerning conventional
- weapons, and second, the duty, involving in its essence questions of pru-
dence and discretion, is wholly improper for judicial enforcement.
Pillar II: The Constitution Girded with International Law
Perhaps the most creative aspect of Professor Miller's argument is
found in the construction of this second pillar where he attempts to
argue that the Constitution imports a duty, to be judicially enforced, to
obey international law, which he asserts is "surely"' 16 incompatible with
nuclear weapons. The argument begins with the proposition that "Con-
gress having been delegated the power to define and punish offenses
against international law, has a duty to carry out that power."' 7 The
thought continues that the President also might as well be assigned a
duty "faithfully to execute" international law.' 8 And then why not have
the Supreme Court "grasp the nettle and point out to the Executive
and the Congress that officials in those branches are charged with
[this] constitutional duty"?'19
Putting aside the question of whether what is called international
law, lacking both an authoritative interpreter and a means of enforce-
ment, can be considered law-putting aside the fact that it is only in
the recent writings of a few academic commentators that nuclear weap-
ons are regarded as contrary to international law 20---putting aside all of
16. Id.at 23.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 35.
20. Professor Miller is apparently depending on the work of R. FALK, L.
MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oc-
casional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program, Center of International Studies,
Princeton University (1981)). Other than this work, it is hard to discover muoch that
can be used to support Professor Miller's claim that nuclear weapons are unconstitu-
tional. There is the 1961 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1653, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) asserting the use of nuclear
691
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this-the argument that international law has a place in the Constitu-
tion superior to ordinary legislation and presidential action is wholly
without foundation in the text of the Constitution, precedent, or the
Framers' intent. The text of the Constitution does grant Congress the
authority "to define and punish Piracies and Offenses against the Law
of Nations; ' 21 but this authority implies a duty to enforce international
law about as much as the authority of Congress to borrow money22
mandates a duty of deficit spending.
Recognizing the discretionary authority of Congress to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations and recognizing that this re-
quires the principle leges posteriores priores contraries abrogant (later
laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary to them), the Court has con-
sistently held that Congress has the authority, to which courts will give
effect, to violate international law-even treaties-the most fundamen-
tal datum of international law. What international law provides, wrote
Chief Justice John Marshall, "is a guide the sovereign follows or aban-
dons at his will. The rule is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign:
and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it
may be disregarded. s23 The fact that Congress violates international
law is, as Professor Louis Henkin has succinctly made the point, "con-
stitutionally irrelevant. '24
Nor has Professor Miller produced one shred of evidence that the
Framers wished to subordinate national sovereignty to the dictates of
international law. The wisdom of the contrary position-that occasion-
ally it is necessary to subordinate international law to national sover-
eignty-is reinforced when we see that some, such as Professor Miller,
are willing to see as a dictate of international law the freshest idealisms
weapons to be illegal (55 states voting in favor of the resolution, 20 states against, and
26 states abstaining). But as Professor Michael Akehurst points out in A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (1978 3d ed), "A General Assembly res-
olution of this type is, at most, merely evidence of customary law; but the voting figures
for this resolution show the absence of a generally accepted custom." The United
States voted no while the U.S.S.R. voted yes, possibly because of the latter's nuclear
inferiority at the time. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. Id.
23. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
24. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 410 n.l1 (1972).
170 Nova Law Journal 7:19821
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of a few academic commentators regardless of the consequences for na-
tional security.
To say that his interpretation is without foundation in conventional
construction of the Constitution may leave Professor Miller undaunted,
for again he understands the Constitution in terms of its "intentions"
and he understands these intentions to be those of the well intended
"clergy, physicians, scientists, and businessmen"2 5 rather than the more
modest ones of the Framers. If this beneficent sentiment proved insuffi-
cient to bestir the Due Process clause and the Preamble to join the
march against the bomb, perhaps it is sufficiently engaging to disarm
the world through international law. But again, even if we grant mo-
mentarily that Congressional authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations could be puffed into a duty, which the courts
could enforce, we confront the problems of limited power. Court in-
junctions could only extend to the United States government, and thus
we would simply have to return to the prudential alternatives discussed
above, running from submission to dominance.
Pursuing Professor Miller's apparent assumption that good inten-
tions make up for what, under conventional interpretations of the Con-
stitution, would be usurpation of authority, there may be, however, a
way in which the Supreme Court could grasp the nettle and eliminate
threats to the lives, liberties, and properties of the citizenry. It could
make itself the authoritative interpreter of international law. It could
secretly authorize a Super Manhattan project which would culminate
in the construction of a nuclear weapon awesome and accurate enough
to cow into submission all nuclear powers. Then the Court would be
able to give clout to the special masters it appoints to strategic negotia-
tions and to back the injunctions it would issue around the world in the
name of enforcing international law.
Other than with this reinforcement, I can see no way that the su-
perstructure of Miller's argument can withstand even minimal scrutiny.
The Foundation
My inquiry thus far has focused on the superstructure of Professor
Miller's argument, though I have indirectly touched on the adequacy of
25. Miller, supra note 1, at 22.
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its foundation. It is time to examine more closely his contention that
nuclear war is "by definition" "unlimited. ' 26 If we fully grant this pre-
mise then the superstructure becomes ironically superfluous. For if nu-
clear war is "definitionally" unlimitable, it must be obviously unlim-
itable. If it is obviously unlimitable, no one with a modicum of
intelligence and concern for self-interest would consider risking it, for
one's missiles would in effect be directed towards oneself and all that
one wishes to preserve. If such a person would not even contemplate the
use of nuclear weapons, we are rendered about as secure against nu-
clear weapons as we could ever expect to be through any judicially en-
forced pronouncements.
But only as an exercise in abstract logic should we grant Professor
Miller his premise. As a military analyst has recently argued, it is ut-
terly ridiculous to believe that generals and politicians "would become
so absorbed in the conflict-as-a-game that they would reply tit for tat,
move by move, instead of stopping the war as soon as it had become
nuclear, before it could destroy their own cities and their own fami-
lies."27 One would have to believe that mankind both in the battlefield
and in civilian authority had become robots. And if we thus reasonably
deny Professor Miller his premise, the structure of the argument
collapses.
This is not to say that in several respects, I do not share Professor
Miller's wistful yearning for a world free of nuclear weapons. There
was at least dignity in the defense of Carthage in a way there can
never be in a defense against nuclear destruction. But to allow this
yearning for dignity to inform one's interpretation of the Constitution
and judicial power, is to lay bare the frailty of good intentions.
Can Lawyers Contribute to the Debate?
Although Professor Miller urges the Supreme Court to "grasp the
nettle" 28 on the question of the constitutionality of nuclear weapons, he
realizes that it is "naive" 29 to expect the Justices presently to do so. His
26. Id. at 30.
27. Luttwak, How to Think About Nuclear War, 74 COMMENTARY 21, 26 (Aug.
1982).
28. Miller, supra note 1, at 35.
29. Id. at 36.
172 7:19821
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apparent hope is to foster a "dialogue about the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons,"30 which in a fashion akin to the reapportionment
cases will move the Court closer to his wished for declaration. He asks
then rhetorically: "Is it really foolish to contend that law and lawyers
have something useful to contribute to the growing debate about nu-
clear war?" 31
Lawyers should be able to contribute to this debate. They should
be able to remind us of the relevance of constitutional principles to
changing circumstances. But to do so in the case of nuclear strategy,
they must not only be aware of constitutional principles and of the rele-
vance of those principles to the larger ends and limits of law and polit-
ics; they must also be knowledgeable as to the nature of those changing
circumstances, which in this case means knowledge of diplomacy and
strategy in the nuclear age. These are demanding criteria, but occa-
sionally lawyers do meet them and make valuable contributions. 32
On that concluding point I find myself in partial accord with Pro-
fessor Miller. It is not entirely foolish to contend that lawyers have
something useful to contribute to the growing debate about nuclear
war. But it is foolish to believe that many who meet the above criteria
will agree with Professor Miller.
30. Id. at 36.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Cf. S. TALBOTT, ENDGAME 20-21 (1979).
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